“If we’re determined, we only have one possible future, so it’s possible that Frankfurt Cases don’t even apply to us. They’re just describing someone with Libertarian free will, and Incompatibilists would happily agree they’re morally responsible.”
Yes, exactly. You laid it out well.
Also I do think it was worth including causal luck in the taxonomy as it seems that the other three did not explicitly include the deterministic/random decision-making process of the brain.
P.S. Is there a school of philosophy that refuses to rely on implausible thought experiments for its main arguments? I would buy its t-shirt. Especially if it also forswore abstract concepts a certain number of degrees removed from empirical reality 😁
That’s fair! I guess I’m more critical when they’re used to defend the status quo on issues of real world suffering-related impact like animal welfare and retributive punishment.
I definitely feel you. Although, I only find it annoying when people imagine unlikely scenarios that are irrelevant. Like, sometimes people try to imagine a form of animals farming that's totally painless and gives them good lives - and then if you concede that's permissable, they conclude that our current practices are fine. Obviously though, that doesn't follow, because their unlikely example doesn't actually obtain in the real world, and that's a bait and switch.
However, there are some strange thoughts experiments, like Mary's room, that still work. That's because they do a good job of isolating intuitions and staying on point. So, sometimes outlandish thought experiments are good! As long as they're constructed well, and you draw conclusions that actually logically follow from them.
I think Frankfurt Cases are closer to the latter than the former. At least, I can see what Frankfurt is trying to do there. I think they might fail, but not because they're weird and unrealistic, but probably because they fail to act as a true counter example to PAP (still undecided though).
Yep, I'm on board with most of that. Not a fan of when Incompatibilists accused compatibilists of redefining free will. Sure, maybe most people think at first they need PAP to be responsible, but most people can be wrong
I think the epistemic component is a possible way out of Flicker of Freedom - I think that's what Taylor Cyr advances. Basically, while I'm not familiar enough with it yet to make a conclusion, the fact that Cyr thinks he has a response is enough to cast doubt on the success on FoF for me. I just think he's smart
Very nice article. Incompatibilism is not obviously wrong, and it's important to point that out.
Nevertheless, I am what Fischer calls a semi-compatibilist -- someone who believes that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible. The arguments above for (semi-)incompatibilism leave me unmoved.
Note that I do not believe in physical determinism; I just don't think physical determinism would make any difference.
I think it's important to distinguish between people's belief **in** free will from their beliefs **about** free will. Generally, if you ask someone(1) to prove that they have free will they'll (after looking at you like you're insane) raise an arm or do some other arbitrary action. This is considered **proof**. "You have just seen me exercise my free will, (you moron)." If you ask them to explain, they'll use something like the "I didn't have to do that"/PAP argument. I take that to show that people(1) believe that they have free will and that alternative possibilities are necessary for free will. That's their belief **in** versus their belief **about**.
Importantly, it is possible for there to be widespread incorrect beliefs about something that actually exists, and that's what I take to be going on here. Experimental philosophers have asked what happens when those two beliefs are set at odds. Their results have been mixed, but **when it comes to particular cases** (versus abstract theorizing) the belief in free will and responsibility wins out over the belief in PAP. (See the SEP article on experimental philosophy for an overview.) The belief in free will is fundamental and its existence is **proved** by the arbitrary actions taken; the PAP is merely a (reasonable but mistaken) belief about how that free will comes about.
I believe the source of the error to be a confusion between different kinds of possibilities -- physical versus epistemic. The "flicker of freedom" is based on an epistemic possibility that's not physical. The chipped man is not aware that he can't avoid shooting the president. The heartless woman is not aware that any attempt to save the drowning child is doomed to fail. They are morally culpable because they do the bad thing by the free will that they **demonstrably** have. The factors enforcing the outcome (shot president/drowned child) are irrelevant. Determinism is (or would be) irrelevant.
Of course some philosophers **do** define "free will" as some sort of incompatibilist power, and so they are not talking about the same thing as people in general (1). But that's not because **compatibilists** are redefining the term; it's because those philosophers are defining the term using its supposed properties instead of just **looking** to see what it references. (2)
(1) Westerners, I'm talking about. I don't know that I've ever argued with anyone non-Western about free will. What I'm describing here is very common in my discussions with incompatibilist non-philosophers about free will.
(2) I see similar things in arguments proving God's (non)existence. A definition is provided and the argument shows that such a thing does (not) exist. That's not the God that I was told about in Catechism, and so it is utterly irrelevant to my atheism.
Good read. But our views diverge pretty early on in the piece when you talk of moral responsibility - blame worthiness and praiseworthiness. The Sam Harris position is basically that no one is praiseworthy or blameworthy. In fact, Sam would probably go further and say the “self” as something separate from the antecedent causes and conditions is itself an illusion. So assigning praise or blame is pointless except for incentivizing or disincentivizing actions in the future (both by the person in question and others via deterrence
I get the impression that you think this article is arguing for moral responsibility, which I find odd. It's arguing for Incompatibilism, which is a view you can hold and be a free will skeptic, or a libertarian. I don't weight in on moral responsibility here, where did I give you that impression?
If you ever want to jump on a call to clear things up I'd be happy to, because I really don't think I've said much that you have reason to disagree with, even if you are a free will skeptic
I don’t think I’m disagreeing with your position on free will or moral responsibility per se. Perhaps a meta disagreement. I think when philosophers say things like moral responsibility, it’s unclear what they mean. Can you tell me what you mean by praiseworthiness or blameworthiness ?
Oh right, in this context blameworthiness is when someone is deserving of punishment in a basic moral desert sense, not in a merely "you're the proximate cause of this harm, so we need to do something about you" sense that you might mean. The sort of thing where they would be deserving of punishment for more than instrumental reasons
Right, but Sam concludes that there's no blameworthiness because he's an Incompatibilist AND a Determinist. He thinks moral responsibility would require PAP, but doesn't think an ability to do otherwise actually obtains. The Incompatibalist/Compatibilist debate isn't actually about whether or not we have moral responsibility, it's about whether or not moral responsibility is compatible with Determinism
Regarding Frankfurt cases and presupposing PAP, I always thought of it as displaying that we didn't need PAP to be true to be free and culpable. I see this as being done by placing an agent in such a universe and stripping them of this PAP capacity and still showing that they're blameworthy. Thus portraying that they didn't need PAP to be true to be free, even if PAP were true.
Suppose Harriet can do otherwise in normal conditions.
Next suppose she's walking past a drowning child in a pond and doesn't try and help. She can't be asked. It's one of those days.
Unbeknownst to her, there is an impenetrable invisible force field around the pond, and she couldn't have saved them, even if she wanted to.
Yet in such a world, she totally seems blameworthy–even though she couldn't have saved the child if she had tried. If she had instead tried to help them, then she's pretty cool.
Then since we can see that Harriet can be blameworthy for her actions in that world despite not being able to rescue the kid, we can then infer that we don't need that sly dog PAP for top-dollar freedom.
Does that sound legitimate? Or am I totally missing the point?
Well, it feels like she still could have done otherwise - she could've tried to save the child and failed. I think the Flicker Of Freedom response still applies here
Hmm I see. She could have done otherwise in the sense of she could have tried to save the kid, or not save the kid–as opposed to actually save the kid.
Nice article. Educational as well as entertaining.
Thanks! I I appreciate the kind words
“If we’re determined, we only have one possible future, so it’s possible that Frankfurt Cases don’t even apply to us. They’re just describing someone with Libertarian free will, and Incompatibilists would happily agree they’re morally responsible.”
Yes, exactly. You laid it out well.
Also I do think it was worth including causal luck in the taxonomy as it seems that the other three did not explicitly include the deterministic/random decision-making process of the brain.
P.S. Is there a school of philosophy that refuses to rely on implausible thought experiments for its main arguments? I would buy its t-shirt. Especially if it also forswore abstract concepts a certain number of degrees removed from empirical reality 😁
Hahah, but weird and out there thought experiments are the most fun part of philosophy! It's why I'm here!
That’s fair! I guess I’m more critical when they’re used to defend the status quo on issues of real world suffering-related impact like animal welfare and retributive punishment.
I definitely feel you. Although, I only find it annoying when people imagine unlikely scenarios that are irrelevant. Like, sometimes people try to imagine a form of animals farming that's totally painless and gives them good lives - and then if you concede that's permissable, they conclude that our current practices are fine. Obviously though, that doesn't follow, because their unlikely example doesn't actually obtain in the real world, and that's a bait and switch.
However, there are some strange thoughts experiments, like Mary's room, that still work. That's because they do a good job of isolating intuitions and staying on point. So, sometimes outlandish thought experiments are good! As long as they're constructed well, and you draw conclusions that actually logically follow from them.
I think Frankfurt Cases are closer to the latter than the former. At least, I can see what Frankfurt is trying to do there. I think they might fail, but not because they're weird and unrealistic, but probably because they fail to act as a true counter example to PAP (still undecided though).
Great article! Never thought Fabio could add so much to an article about free will.
Thanks! Fabio makes everything better
Excited to read this but skimming tells me the text is not the only thing to be excited about.
I'm good to my readers ;)
Yep, I'm on board with most of that. Not a fan of when Incompatibilists accused compatibilists of redefining free will. Sure, maybe most people think at first they need PAP to be responsible, but most people can be wrong
I think the epistemic component is a possible way out of Flicker of Freedom - I think that's what Taylor Cyr advances. Basically, while I'm not familiar enough with it yet to make a conclusion, the fact that Cyr thinks he has a response is enough to cast doubt on the success on FoF for me. I just think he's smart
Very nice article. Incompatibilism is not obviously wrong, and it's important to point that out.
Nevertheless, I am what Fischer calls a semi-compatibilist -- someone who believes that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible. The arguments above for (semi-)incompatibilism leave me unmoved.
Note that I do not believe in physical determinism; I just don't think physical determinism would make any difference.
I think it's important to distinguish between people's belief **in** free will from their beliefs **about** free will. Generally, if you ask someone(1) to prove that they have free will they'll (after looking at you like you're insane) raise an arm or do some other arbitrary action. This is considered **proof**. "You have just seen me exercise my free will, (you moron)." If you ask them to explain, they'll use something like the "I didn't have to do that"/PAP argument. I take that to show that people(1) believe that they have free will and that alternative possibilities are necessary for free will. That's their belief **in** versus their belief **about**.
Importantly, it is possible for there to be widespread incorrect beliefs about something that actually exists, and that's what I take to be going on here. Experimental philosophers have asked what happens when those two beliefs are set at odds. Their results have been mixed, but **when it comes to particular cases** (versus abstract theorizing) the belief in free will and responsibility wins out over the belief in PAP. (See the SEP article on experimental philosophy for an overview.) The belief in free will is fundamental and its existence is **proved** by the arbitrary actions taken; the PAP is merely a (reasonable but mistaken) belief about how that free will comes about.
I believe the source of the error to be a confusion between different kinds of possibilities -- physical versus epistemic. The "flicker of freedom" is based on an epistemic possibility that's not physical. The chipped man is not aware that he can't avoid shooting the president. The heartless woman is not aware that any attempt to save the drowning child is doomed to fail. They are morally culpable because they do the bad thing by the free will that they **demonstrably** have. The factors enforcing the outcome (shot president/drowned child) are irrelevant. Determinism is (or would be) irrelevant.
Of course some philosophers **do** define "free will" as some sort of incompatibilist power, and so they are not talking about the same thing as people in general (1). But that's not because **compatibilists** are redefining the term; it's because those philosophers are defining the term using its supposed properties instead of just **looking** to see what it references. (2)
(1) Westerners, I'm talking about. I don't know that I've ever argued with anyone non-Western about free will. What I'm describing here is very common in my discussions with incompatibilist non-philosophers about free will.
(2) I see similar things in arguments proving God's (non)existence. A definition is provided and the argument shows that such a thing does (not) exist. That's not the God that I was told about in Catechism, and so it is utterly irrelevant to my atheism.
Good read. But our views diverge pretty early on in the piece when you talk of moral responsibility - blame worthiness and praiseworthiness. The Sam Harris position is basically that no one is praiseworthy or blameworthy. In fact, Sam would probably go further and say the “self” as something separate from the antecedent causes and conditions is itself an illusion. So assigning praise or blame is pointless except for incentivizing or disincentivizing actions in the future (both by the person in question and others via deterrence
I get the impression that you think this article is arguing for moral responsibility, which I find odd. It's arguing for Incompatibilism, which is a view you can hold and be a free will skeptic, or a libertarian. I don't weight in on moral responsibility here, where did I give you that impression?
If you ever want to jump on a call to clear things up I'd be happy to, because I really don't think I've said much that you have reason to disagree with, even if you are a free will skeptic
I don’t think I’m disagreeing with your position on free will or moral responsibility per se. Perhaps a meta disagreement. I think when philosophers say things like moral responsibility, it’s unclear what they mean. Can you tell me what you mean by praiseworthiness or blameworthiness ?
Oh right, in this context blameworthiness is when someone is deserving of punishment in a basic moral desert sense, not in a merely "you're the proximate cause of this harm, so we need to do something about you" sense that you might mean. The sort of thing where they would be deserving of punishment for more than instrumental reasons
Right, but Sam concludes that there's no blameworthiness because he's an Incompatibilist AND a Determinist. He thinks moral responsibility would require PAP, but doesn't think an ability to do otherwise actually obtains. The Incompatibalist/Compatibilist debate isn't actually about whether or not we have moral responsibility, it's about whether or not moral responsibility is compatible with Determinism
Unless you mean something by “blameworthiness”, which is entirely subsumed within a consequentialist conception of “blameworthiness”
Regarding Frankfurt cases and presupposing PAP, I always thought of it as displaying that we didn't need PAP to be true to be free and culpable. I see this as being done by placing an agent in such a universe and stripping them of this PAP capacity and still showing that they're blameworthy. Thus portraying that they didn't need PAP to be true to be free, even if PAP were true.
Suppose Harriet can do otherwise in normal conditions.
Next suppose she's walking past a drowning child in a pond and doesn't try and help. She can't be asked. It's one of those days.
Unbeknownst to her, there is an impenetrable invisible force field around the pond, and she couldn't have saved them, even if she wanted to.
Yet in such a world, she totally seems blameworthy–even though she couldn't have saved the child if she had tried. If she had instead tried to help them, then she's pretty cool.
Then since we can see that Harriet can be blameworthy for her actions in that world despite not being able to rescue the kid, we can then infer that we don't need that sly dog PAP for top-dollar freedom.
Does that sound legitimate? Or am I totally missing the point?
Well, it feels like she still could have done otherwise - she could've tried to save the child and failed. I think the Flicker Of Freedom response still applies here
Hmm I see. She could have done otherwise in the sense of she could have tried to save the kid, or not save the kid–as opposed to actually save the kid.