I am so happy you wrote this piece focused on moral responsibility because it’s something I feel that many hard incompatiblists often gloss over. Even as a pretty staunch incompatiblist myself, I’m at the point where I find it hard to read or listen to other incompatiblists talk about compatiblism because of they don’t often acknowledge that, between determinists, the free will debate is about moral responsibility.
Thanks! I think the next article I write will be for some arguments for incompatibilism. The sort I think Sam should deploy instead of just saying Compatibilists redefine free will
> I’d wager if you asked people on the street what free will is, you’d get a wide array of mostly confused answers.
BUT SO WOULD SAM HARRIS! He claims that the average notion _is_ confused and inconsistent.
Also, more on the point, while he tend to relegate this to footnotes, in his book(let) on Free Will, he (correctly, imo) notes that "compatibilist" redefinition doesn't change the answers for moral responsibility (and even claims Dennett agrees).
Harris should be taken seriously only as a topic of sociologic or anthropologic study. He's deeply unserious as a thinker. As a PhD statistician and professional data scientist, I had a similar experience listening to him in the genetics of intelligence. There also be displays a combo of arrogance and a revealed complete lack of basic understanding of the positiva he do condescendingly argues against. He displays near zero ability to think probabilistically, distributionally, or casually in a sophisticated way.
That's a good idea! I have his book, and it seems that he makes the same mistake Sam does. He just argued that are actions are determined the whole time lol
No? This is not what naive realism looks like, and Sapolsky's position (which, yes, is basically the same as Harris's) is not similar to first-order perception and is, nonetheless, prima facie simply correct.
I agree that the Libertarian conception of free will is incoherent, but think that incompatibalists may have a point that moral responsibility requires it - I'm agnostic right now. Still, Sam would be a lot more convincing if he didn't just assert the Principle of Alternate Possibilities was required for moral responsibility, and actually argued for it
I am so happy you wrote this piece focused on moral responsibility because it’s something I feel that many hard incompatiblists often gloss over. Even as a pretty staunch incompatiblist myself, I’m at the point where I find it hard to read or listen to other incompatiblists talk about compatiblism because of they don’t often acknowledge that, between determinists, the free will debate is about moral responsibility.
Thanks! I think the next article I write will be for some arguments for incompatibilism. The sort I think Sam should deploy instead of just saying Compatibilists redefine free will
> I’d wager if you asked people on the street what free will is, you’d get a wide array of mostly confused answers.
BUT SO WOULD SAM HARRIS! He claims that the average notion _is_ confused and inconsistent.
Also, more on the point, while he tend to relegate this to footnotes, in his book(let) on Free Will, he (correctly, imo) notes that "compatibilist" redefinition doesn't change the answers for moral responsibility (and even claims Dennett agrees).
Harris should be taken seriously only as a topic of sociologic or anthropologic study. He's deeply unserious as a thinker. As a PhD statistician and professional data scientist, I had a similar experience listening to him in the genetics of intelligence. There also be displays a combo of arrogance and a revealed complete lack of basic understanding of the positiva he do condescendingly argues against. He displays near zero ability to think probabilistically, distributionally, or casually in a sophisticated way.
You should do a piece on Robert Sapolsky's take on it. Listening to that man drives me crazy lol
That's a good idea! I have his book, and it seems that he makes the same mistake Sam does. He just argued that are actions are determined the whole time lol
Is Sapolsky not a TEXTBOOK example of this:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism_(psychology)
Which considering his profession is quite interesting.
There are certain topics that cause the human mind to tilt, and Free Will is one of them.
No? This is not what naive realism looks like, and Sapolsky's position (which, yes, is basically the same as Harris's) is not similar to first-order perception and is, nonetheless, prima facie simply correct.
I agree that the Libertarian conception of free will is incoherent, but think that incompatibalists may have a point that moral responsibility requires it - I'm agnostic right now. Still, Sam would be a lot more convincing if he didn't just assert the Principle of Alternate Possibilities was required for moral responsibility, and actually argued for it