As someone who was more an English/history guy than a math/science guy in school, I would not have expected this topic to be interesting, but you made it fascinating. You would probably have made an excellent physics teacher.
How can someone be wrong about so much but be so likeable? Cut it out Connor, your attempts to bring me to the dark side through your charm aren't going to work.
Seriously though, great article. One minor point I feel compelled to make: "I just find it confusing when people say my subjective experience literally is atoms." -- I don't disagree with this intuition! This is why I find identity theory pretty implausible (not as implausible as dualism, mind you 😉). Under functionalism, it isn't that the atoms/cells themselves constitute consciousness, but the functions they play do--the old "hardware software" distinction.
Anyways, eventually I'll get around to writing about consciousness and completely change your mind, just you wait.
You're right, functionalism is worth me addressing then! Thanks for the comment - this battle will last millennia (which we will live through, because we are reincarnating souls)
Fun idea, but I prefer to write than doing debates. I feel like I'm really bad at expressing myself in person hahah, hard to get my thoughts straight on the fly
I highly recommend Matthew Skene's dissertation "Putting the Ghost Back in the Machine" as a great treatment of philosophy of mind debates. He also covers agent-causal theories of free will, the case for phenomenal conservatism, the empirical case for free will, and the empirical reasons for why philosophers aren't rational about philosophical issues. He cites Caplan on several empirical things (as you should).
I also tend to think that concerns about conservation of energy wrt dualism are not that big of a deal, because of soldiers and handshakes.
But I have some sort of sympathy for Epiphenomenalism, because the view that the mental causes things in the physical realm just seems too outlandish and spooky to me.
My first position was Epiphenomenalism! I took it as a given, really. But like I say, the unlikelihood of some behaviours and psychophysical harmony turned me off it
I do see the force in those considerations. That's why I don't adopt Epiphenomenalism (also because Phil of Mind is still quite above my paygrade, tbh). I think the argument from the fact that we talk about being conscious is the most powerful one for me. We really wouldn't expect that given Epiphenomenalism
As someone who was more an English/history guy than a math/science guy in school, I would not have expected this topic to be interesting, but you made it fascinating. You would probably have made an excellent physics teacher.
Thanks! I'm still learning as it's a new topic for me, but I enjoy writing as I go. Glad you enjoyed it
How can someone be wrong about so much but be so likeable? Cut it out Connor, your attempts to bring me to the dark side through your charm aren't going to work.
Seriously though, great article. One minor point I feel compelled to make: "I just find it confusing when people say my subjective experience literally is atoms." -- I don't disagree with this intuition! This is why I find identity theory pretty implausible (not as implausible as dualism, mind you 😉). Under functionalism, it isn't that the atoms/cells themselves constitute consciousness, but the functions they play do--the old "hardware software" distinction.
Anyways, eventually I'll get around to writing about consciousness and completely change your mind, just you wait.
You're right, functionalism is worth me addressing then! Thanks for the comment - this battle will last millennia (which we will live through, because we are reincarnating souls)
Can't we just do a podcast together and get this whole thing squared away in one 30 minute episode?
Fun idea, but I prefer to write than doing debates. I feel like I'm really bad at expressing myself in person hahah, hard to get my thoughts straight on the fly
Fine, coward. Maybe in the next millennium
I highly recommend Matthew Skene's dissertation "Putting the Ghost Back in the Machine" as a great treatment of philosophy of mind debates. He also covers agent-causal theories of free will, the case for phenomenal conservatism, the empirical case for free will, and the empirical reasons for why philosophers aren't rational about philosophical issues. He cites Caplan on several empirical things (as you should).
Awesome! Will check it out
Good read!
I also tend to think that concerns about conservation of energy wrt dualism are not that big of a deal, because of soldiers and handshakes.
But I have some sort of sympathy for Epiphenomenalism, because the view that the mental causes things in the physical realm just seems too outlandish and spooky to me.
My first position was Epiphenomenalism! I took it as a given, really. But like I say, the unlikelihood of some behaviours and psychophysical harmony turned me off it
I do see the force in those considerations. That's why I don't adopt Epiphenomenalism (also because Phil of Mind is still quite above my paygrade, tbh). I think the argument from the fact that we talk about being conscious is the most powerful one for me. We really wouldn't expect that given Epiphenomenalism