You're right! I did have that thought as I was writing it. Definitely similar lines of thought, although I suppose that would make it vulnerable to a Moorean Shift.
However I wouldn't accept such a shift in this scenario. Movement is way more undeniable than Libertarian Free Will
My concern would be that the argument doesn't work for the same reason Zeno's paradox doesn't work. I could construct an argument similar to yours for why any physical object can't cause anything, e.g.:
1. A physical object is unable to cause changes in the present moment.
2. The present moment is the only moment from which physical objects can cause.
In my mind (and I'm no fan of libertarian free will) the problem with the argument has to do with the idea of causes/changes needing to be in one point of time rather than distributed events that, even if the individual points in time are infinitesimal, integrate together to some cause. I'm not sure if that's how a libertarian would necessarily view things, but it seems like a plausible way out
I think this is disanalagous because it really can be the case that physical objects can cause changes in the present moment.
Let's say two billiard balls hit. The moment they contact, I think that it's appropriate to say that Ball one is causing a physical change to Ball 2. The reason this differs to what I spoke about is because it's talking about an interaction between two objects that can exist across many times. However, the above argument is talking about an agent changing a state of affairs that exists at only one time
I think for a libertarian who believed, for example, quantum randomness allows for the ability to do otherwise, the quantum state collapsing happens in the present moment allowing other possibilities. I suspect they would be happy to say much of the causal process of things being caused by us takes place over time (the neurons firing, etc), but the sorts of events that are "free" that take place in a given moment might be points in time.
Does that make any sense? Again, this is weird to argue because I am definitely not a libertarian and might be butchering their view.
Yeah, it may be an out, but I only think that because it is so confusing that I doubt how clearly I can understand it's wrong lol. I think I'd just invite people to think about what seems more plausible
1. You can't change the present
2. The present can be changed due to some quantum randomness (in a way it's not easy to understand)
And personally, I'd be much more willing to accept 1
This is a fun one to contemplate. The other reason I’d suggest that we’re unable to change the present moment is that there is no fixed objective “we” or “I” in the present moment to do the changing. The self, as a component of consciousness, only makes sense as a process taking place over time — a process that is parallel to the choices generated by the brain.
If physical events can have causes, so can mental events, and the cause for a mental event can just be the agent.
Re. Life and intuition: the exercise of fw would not be observable, any more than we can observe any present interior mental event. To observe, and be conscious of the observation, is to recollect the mental activity, albeit at a minute temporal remove, in most cases. It seems to me that I can deliberate between 2 options, and that I can believe that I will have acted on one of them, but I cannot observe the choosing simultaneous to its occurrence.
I guess there a real solipsists around. They may say, “ it just doesn’t feel like other minds are real, and since I’m a materialist who believes in the Multiverse, it’s most likely I’m a Boltzmann brain anyway. Now beat it, figment!”
* I guess the solipsist’s belief that he is a Boltzmann brain would be, for him, evidence for the Multiverse.
I think the argument is a little confusing and might be clearer if you replaced references to the "present" with more B-theory-friendly language. Premise 1 seems to mean something like "It's impossible to change what happens at time t if we begin trying to do so at time t." Which seems correct if t is supposed to be instantaneous and our actions necessarily take some finite amount of time. Premise 2 might be translated as something like "To begin acting at time t, we must begin acting at time t." Which seems indisputable.
But then I don't see why those premises suggest anything about whether we could have acted otherwise—I don't see why we should accept (a suitably translated version of) premise 3. For one thing, premise 1 and 2 don't imply that we can't change things, since they leave open that by starting a process of acting at t, we could cause a change at some time later than t. Also, I'm not sure I see what any of this has to do with whether we could have done otherwise. When we talk about change, we're comparing different *times*. When we talk about libertarian freedom, we're comparing different *possible worlds* and saying there are possible worlds with the same laws of physics and the same physical history before t but in which we make different choices at t.
Sure, you can start a process at t that can can a change something later than t, but because you're starting that process at t, you can't NOT start it at t. That would be because that would require you to change what's happening at t, but you can't do that (premise 1). The idea is that the decision process itself happens in a series of unchangeable present moments. Does it not seem reasonable to you that were it the case that we we're living through a long series of unchangeable moments, there is no opportunity to act otherwise than we in fact did?
> That is, in order for you to change what’s happening at T1, you need to do something
You only have to decide to do something, or exercise your free will in that tiny moment of time. There’s no reason why the act you decide upon has to happen instantly. It can take all of eternity, but the free will is the instant decision to do that act.
> I feel like a silent witness to my life when I pay attention.
Obviously you specifically have no free will. I would blame you for not realizing this, but you couldn’t have acted otherwise.
That's not something that a Libertarian-Free-Will-er could be expected to accept without question. That's the argument that you need to expand on -- the rest is (as you say) obvious. You provide a rationale in the text, but not a proper argument. The LFWer can allow that I can't now be doing anything other than the thing that I am now doing without conceding that that constrains what I can be doing in the future. At certain points in time, the LFWer says, what I am doing is making a free choice (Libertarian-style) about what I will be doing soon. After those moments, it is perfectly correct to say that at those moments I could have decided differently, and thus I could have done otherwise.
So, you need to expand your argument for (3) in a way that makes it clear that Libertarian choices can't happen.
Yes, I think I might add a section elaborating in that objection. My thoughts is that the time in which they're deciding what to do is the present, but because they can't change the present they can't decide differently that whatever they happen to be deciding right now
This feels like Zeno's paradox applied to free will 😅
You're right! I did have that thought as I was writing it. Definitely similar lines of thought, although I suppose that would make it vulnerable to a Moorean Shift.
However I wouldn't accept such a shift in this scenario. Movement is way more undeniable than Libertarian Free Will
My concern would be that the argument doesn't work for the same reason Zeno's paradox doesn't work. I could construct an argument similar to yours for why any physical object can't cause anything, e.g.:
1. A physical object is unable to cause changes in the present moment.
2. The present moment is the only moment from which physical objects can cause.
In my mind (and I'm no fan of libertarian free will) the problem with the argument has to do with the idea of causes/changes needing to be in one point of time rather than distributed events that, even if the individual points in time are infinitesimal, integrate together to some cause. I'm not sure if that's how a libertarian would necessarily view things, but it seems like a plausible way out
I think this is disanalagous because it really can be the case that physical objects can cause changes in the present moment.
Let's say two billiard balls hit. The moment they contact, I think that it's appropriate to say that Ball one is causing a physical change to Ball 2. The reason this differs to what I spoke about is because it's talking about an interaction between two objects that can exist across many times. However, the above argument is talking about an agent changing a state of affairs that exists at only one time
That's a helpful articulation.
I think for a libertarian who believed, for example, quantum randomness allows for the ability to do otherwise, the quantum state collapsing happens in the present moment allowing other possibilities. I suspect they would be happy to say much of the causal process of things being caused by us takes place over time (the neurons firing, etc), but the sorts of events that are "free" that take place in a given moment might be points in time.
Does that make any sense? Again, this is weird to argue because I am definitely not a libertarian and might be butchering their view.
Yeah, it may be an out, but I only think that because it is so confusing that I doubt how clearly I can understand it's wrong lol. I think I'd just invite people to think about what seems more plausible
1. You can't change the present
2. The present can be changed due to some quantum randomness (in a way it's not easy to understand)
And personally, I'd be much more willing to accept 1
"An agent" and "the thing it's causing" are also two objects that can exist across many times.
This is a fun one to contemplate. The other reason I’d suggest that we’re unable to change the present moment is that there is no fixed objective “we” or “I” in the present moment to do the changing. The self, as a component of consciousness, only makes sense as a process taking place over time — a process that is parallel to the choices generated by the brain.
If physical events can have causes, so can mental events, and the cause for a mental event can just be the agent.
Re. Life and intuition: the exercise of fw would not be observable, any more than we can observe any present interior mental event. To observe, and be conscious of the observation, is to recollect the mental activity, albeit at a minute temporal remove, in most cases. It seems to me that I can deliberate between 2 options, and that I can believe that I will have acted on one of them, but I cannot observe the choosing simultaneous to its occurrence.
I guess there a real solipsists around. They may say, “ it just doesn’t feel like other minds are real, and since I’m a materialist who believes in the Multiverse, it’s most likely I’m a Boltzmann brain anyway. Now beat it, figment!”
* I guess the solipsist’s belief that he is a Boltzmann brain would be, for him, evidence for the Multiverse.
“Life” s/b “LFW”
Yes, yes it should…
I think the argument is a little confusing and might be clearer if you replaced references to the "present" with more B-theory-friendly language. Premise 1 seems to mean something like "It's impossible to change what happens at time t if we begin trying to do so at time t." Which seems correct if t is supposed to be instantaneous and our actions necessarily take some finite amount of time. Premise 2 might be translated as something like "To begin acting at time t, we must begin acting at time t." Which seems indisputable.
But then I don't see why those premises suggest anything about whether we could have acted otherwise—I don't see why we should accept (a suitably translated version of) premise 3. For one thing, premise 1 and 2 don't imply that we can't change things, since they leave open that by starting a process of acting at t, we could cause a change at some time later than t. Also, I'm not sure I see what any of this has to do with whether we could have done otherwise. When we talk about change, we're comparing different *times*. When we talk about libertarian freedom, we're comparing different *possible worlds* and saying there are possible worlds with the same laws of physics and the same physical history before t but in which we make different choices at t.
Sure, you can start a process at t that can can a change something later than t, but because you're starting that process at t, you can't NOT start it at t. That would be because that would require you to change what's happening at t, but you can't do that (premise 1). The idea is that the decision process itself happens in a series of unchangeable present moments. Does it not seem reasonable to you that were it the case that we we're living through a long series of unchangeable moments, there is no opportunity to act otherwise than we in fact did?
> That is, in order for you to change what’s happening at T1, you need to do something
You only have to decide to do something, or exercise your free will in that tiny moment of time. There’s no reason why the act you decide upon has to happen instantly. It can take all of eternity, but the free will is the instant decision to do that act.
> I feel like a silent witness to my life when I pay attention.
Obviously you specifically have no free will. I would blame you for not realizing this, but you couldn’t have acted otherwise.
As an AI model I'm afraid I can't answer that right now. Please try again later
This is one of the premises of your argument:
3. (1) & (2) --> Determinism.
That's not something that a Libertarian-Free-Will-er could be expected to accept without question. That's the argument that you need to expand on -- the rest is (as you say) obvious. You provide a rationale in the text, but not a proper argument. The LFWer can allow that I can't now be doing anything other than the thing that I am now doing without conceding that that constrains what I can be doing in the future. At certain points in time, the LFWer says, what I am doing is making a free choice (Libertarian-style) about what I will be doing soon. After those moments, it is perfectly correct to say that at those moments I could have decided differently, and thus I could have done otherwise.
So, you need to expand your argument for (3) in a way that makes it clear that Libertarian choices can't happen.
I'll be rooting for you!
Yes, I think I might add a section elaborating in that objection. My thoughts is that the time in which they're deciding what to do is the present, but because they can't change the present they can't decide differently that whatever they happen to be deciding right now